2026 - Friends of the Congo

Security in North Kivu: military governor regains full control of the front line

July 20, 2026

Against a backdrop of the threat posed by Islamist terrorists from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Beni region, the military governor of North Kivu has just been reappointed to lead military operations across the entire province.

According to a telegram signed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Mr. Guy Kabombo Muadiamvita, this instruction comes directly from the Head of State: ‘I hereby inform you that, on the instructions of the Supreme Commander of the FARDC, the military governor of North Kivu is to resume command of all military operations throughout the province, in accordance with the aforementioned order concerning measures to implement a state of siege in part of the territory of the DRC,’ the correspondence states.

Whilst some had justified a degree of passivity on the part of the provincial authorities in the face of military operations, the resumption of operations will enable the head of North Kivu to restore the authority of the state.

Some now believe that the governor can no longer afford to complain but must focus on achieving results.

Written by Azarias Mokonzi

In Goma Dance Mobilizes Young People To Protect The Environment

July 20, 2026

Environmental awareness took center stage in the cultural scene on Saturday 27 June 2026 at the University of Goma (UNIGOM), on the Lac campus (formerly Kinyumba). Organized by Tayna Community Radio and Television (RTCT), a public broadcast of ‘Sauti ya Mazingira’ brought together around a hundred students from various faculties to discuss environmental protection issues, just a few days before the launch of Environment Month.

To kick off the discussions, the Inter-Community Cultural Group for Peace performed an intercultural dance highlighting the environmental challenges facing North Kivu province. Through choreography, songs and messages of social commitment, the artists encouraged young people to adopt responsible behavior to help preserve nature, thereby illustrating the role that culture can play in raising public awareness.

A guest on the program, Mr Jean-Pierre Katusele, who has been involved in reforestation activities in Goma for several years, reflected on the major environmental changes the city has undergone over the last three decades.

“Since 1994, the city of Goma has been experiencing profound environmental disruption. Deforestation in Virunga National Park, uncontrolled urbanization, mass population displacement and the volcanic eruptions of 2002 and 2021 have profoundly transformed our environment. Today, we are already feeling the effects of these changes, particularly through rising temperatures,” he explains.

Despite the reforestation efforts undertaken by various stakeholders, he believes the challenges remain considerable. “We are doing our best to reforest the city, but the needs are still immense. Young people must get more involved. We must not, under any circumstances, downplay this threat. We are only passing through this world, but we have a responsibility to preserve a healthy environment for present and future generations,” he says.

For his part, Timothée Buhashe, coordinator of the Ecological Brigade – an organization bringing together student environmentalists from various faculties at the University of Goma – emphasized the need to bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and the realities experienced by communities.

“We generate a great deal of knowledge on environmental issues, but we have a problem with making it accessible to the public. All too often, this knowledge remains confined to universities rather than being used for the benefit of communities,” he laments.

In his view, sustainable solutions require collaboration between researchers and local people. “Communities also possess knowledge that we must listen to. By combining this with scientific knowledge, we can develop solutions tailored to our context. Together, we can slow down this environmental crisis,” he concludes.

The event concluded with artistic performances, serving as a reminder that the fight against climate change is not solely the responsibility of scientists or decision-makers, but can also be championed by artists, young people and cultural figures.

This initiative comes at a time when Goma is facing pressure on its vegetation cover. According to data from Global Forest Watch, the city lost 38 hectares of tree cover between 2001 and 2025, representing a decrease of around 4 per cent compared with the level recorded in 2000. This decline is mainly linked to urban expansion, population pressure and deforestation.

Article and video edited by Victoire Katembo Mbuto

DRC: Murders, threats and legal proceedings against environmental and land rights activists are on the rise

July 20, 2026

A new monitoring report published on 22 June by the organization Alerte Congolaise pour l’Environnement et les Droits de l’Homme (ACEDH) sounds the alarm over the deteriorating situation facing environmental, climate and land rights defenders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

This report, covering the period from August 2025 to March 2026, documents 31 cases of serious violations committed both in areas under government control and in territories affected by the presence of local and foreign armed groups.

According to ACEDH, these violations include, in particular, six cases of murder resulting in the deaths of twelve defenders, sixteen cases of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP), two abductions, three cases of death threats and arbitrary arrests, three instances of damage to property located in protected areas, and one case of a violation of property rights targeting a land rights defender.

“The report highlights the factors underlying violations of the rights and freedoms of environmental and land rights defenders, the alleged actors involved, as well as the dynamics of protection, resilience and local initiatives aimed at defending the rights of communities affected by the exploitation of natural resources,” states ACEDH in a press release published on Monday 22 June.

The document emphasizes that ongoing armed conflicts, the advance of the Congo River Alliance/M23, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the weakness of protection mechanisms are all contributing to the increased vulnerability of defenders.

“From threats to physical attacks, including assassinations, SLAPP suits and restrictions on the freedoms of assembly, demonstration and peaceful gathering, environmental and land rights defenders continue to pay a heavy price,” the report notes.

The organization identifies several aggravating factors, including the use of the judicial system as a tool of repression, the resurgence of targeted killings of community leaders, the restriction of civic space, the rise in land disputes, and the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of these violations.

With regard to strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), Haut-Uélé province tops the list with six documented cases, mainly linked to mining activities. It is followed by Tshopo with five cases associated with mining and forestry. North Kivu, meanwhile, has recorded one case.

The report cites the M23 rebels, certain Mai-Mai groups, the security services, local administrative authorities and networks linked to mining and forestry as among the main alleged perpetrators of the violations. Impunity, influence peddling and corruption are also highlighted as factors contributing to the recurrence of these abuses.

ACEDH calls on the Congolese authorities to bring legal proceedings against those allegedly responsible for the assassinations, murders and enforced disappearances of environmental defenders. The organization also recommends the establishment of appropriate protection mechanisms in areas where mining, logging and oil extraction take place.

“The protection of environmental defenders is an essential prerequisite for the preservation of biodiversity, climate justice and sustainable development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” the report concludes.

Written by Victoire Katembo Mbuto

Caption: Wild animals in Virunga National Park. Photo by Victoire Katembo Mbuto

Erik Prince in Congo: Transnational Business or Imperialism by a Different Name?

July 20, 2026

On April 17^th 2025 the Democratic Republic of the Congo government entered into an agreement with the private military company Frontier Services Group (FSG) led by its notorious leader Erik Prince. While the terms of the agreement are unclear the purpose seems to be to protect mining logistics and streamline government tax collection. This marks the end of dialogue between the two sides dating back to 2023 when Erik Prince offered to send 2000 predominately Latin American mercenaries to the Eastern Congo regions to pushback against rebels and secure mining areas.

The entry of Erik Prince’s private military forces into the Congo isn’t the first time that private military groups have entered the country on the behalf of foreign nations, however it does mark an inflection point as Erik Prince’s company is global in it’s reach and field a capable and technologically advanced army. Erik Prince started his career as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy seals where he went on to develop skills needed for creating the military contractor group Blackwater. In 1996 Blackwater was founded right before the start of the U.S. led war on terror and would participate as security contractors to protect VIP’s in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in which Blackwater operators killed 17 Iraqi civilians the company disbanded, and Erik Prince began working with smaller military groups like Vectus Global in Haiti, Reflex Response in the UAE, and most prominently the Hong Kong based Frontier Services Group throughout Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

These private armies are often brought in by governments in order to subdue rebel or criminal armed groups. This is due to many states lacking conventional military organization methods to solve the problem or due to a desire to have some measure of plausible deniability for actions of a government with the price given to the mercenaries being a share of minerals or tax revenue however credible allegations of war crimes and civilian killings have followed many of these groups as their missions lack oversight and operate with less respect for the rules of war. As Congo is also a member of the African Union their employment of mercenaries is in violation of the 1977 Organization for African Unity treaty on the prohibition of mercenary forces in Africa.

Vectus Global has been estimated to have killed dozens of civilians including children in Haitian drone strikes, while FSG attempted to supply weapons to South Sudan and Libya. In order to move into the Congo however Erik Prince and his FSG group have partnered with Chinese government backed investment firms like CITIC in order to protect Chinese owned mines and interests. This as well as allegations that FSG trained Chinese military personnel led to sanctions from the U.S. and takes us to the current agreement that FSG has struck with the Congolese government.

The estimated 700-million-dollar contract currently places mercenaries in the mineral rich Katanga region to protect valuable copper and cobalt mines that the DRC seeks to use to re-establish it’s export revenue. On the ground troops mostly consist of Latin American ex-military personnel with some unconfirmed reports about former French Foreign Legion fighters also being involved. While Washington has remained mostly neutral on Erik Prince’s deals with the Congo they do fit well into the minerals for security agreement that President Trump has been working towards with the current Congolese government. Despite the past friction between the U.S. and Erik Prince over his connections to China they seem willing to tacitly support his operations in the Congo as it indirectly benefits their own mineral extraction contracts to have the M23 and other rebels pushed back.

The DRC government and the Chinese backed mines hope to use this contract to increase the revenue that they can extract from the region as well as prevent possible disruption due to the ongoing M23 rebel war in Eastern Congo. The U.S. also hopes to gain additional security complement their own mineral deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo. This would explain their relative acceptance of the agreement and why Erik Prince may feel confident making this deal that is supported by the Congolese government and wealthy Congolese elites.

Recently Prince’s efforts seem more determined than previous attempts such as with earlier Romanian mercenaries that caused division within the Congolese centers of power. This action caused significant local pushback for their high cost and inequality in pay. This current mercenary force, however, seems to have as of now avoided much the of the same criticism despite their reputation. Given the previous conduct of private military groups connected to Erik Prince it is highly likely that the civilians of the region are merely a means to an end for the company or even worse will be seen as a threat and subsequently brutalized to protect international business. Moving forward strong accountability and respect for human rights could bring about a mutually beneficial agreement for civilians as well as the DRC government and it’s foreign backers but with the current arrangement and contract signed such an outcome looks increasingly unlikely.

Written by Alec Hennessy

(Image taken from Reuters)

References:

Trump’s Mineral Deals; A Convergence of American Interests in the Congo

July 20, 2026

Following the election of Donald Trump as American president in 2024, Trump and the powerful elites around him sought to make deals and agreements covering the American security, political and business interests in the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹ This is occurring during a time when the Tshisekedi government is desperate for international assistance in its war against M23 in the Eastern Congo.² This desperation puts the Congolese government and people in a disadvantaged situation when making negotiations and as shown through many of the agreements signed is negatively impacting security and long-term economic development.

The first agreements signed between the U.S. and DRC came on June 27th, 2026, were listed as a peace deal between the DRC and the Rwanda backed M23 movement however in practice it constituted an example of the business minded transactional contracts that President Trump intended to sign.³ No promises were made by either side to stop the conflict fully the deal only stipulated that the U.S. would receive valuable minerals like cobalt, coltan, gold and tin in exchange for “strategic investment” in both countries which would somehow end the fighting.

After the June deal a larger mineral treaty was signed in December of 2025 called the Washington Agreement.⁴ This agreement was intended to bring a ceasefire to the current conflict but with neither side willing to lay down their arms as of 5 months post agreement it seems that the real purpose of the deal was again mineral rights.⁵ The U.S. walked away with first dibs on Congolese mines and promises that mineral extraction and transport would be done via U.S. owned railways. For the U.S. this agreement was a strategic jackpot in securing American mineral stockpiles and further intensifying the ongoing mineral proxy conflict between the U.S. and China.^6,7

Enforcement of the treaty has been carried out in limited fashion by sanctioning members of the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) as well as former Congolese President Joseph Kabila for their roles in aiding the M23 rebel movement that has been accused of restarting conflict in north and south Kivu.^8,9 While this does indicate that the Trump administration currently views the M23 rebels and their backers as the violators of the Washington Agreement by in large this has not shifted the America First focus that has defined current U.S. foreign policy. The America First focus especially as it relates to Africa consists of the belief that all U.S. dealings in the country should be made without consideration for previous values like human rights protection, and democracy promotion in favor of a opportunistic transaction based relationship.

What remains to be seen is if the current pro-Kinshasa lean in U.S. foreign policy will continue throughout the remainder of Trump’s time in office and in a longer term with a potential transition in the Congolese government happening in 2028.

Deals from the Trump administration, however, do not only cover mineral rights but also migrants deported from the U.S. In light of the recent surge in deportations that have been taking place in the U.S. the Trump administration has taken to deporting immigrants to countries they have no connection to.¹⁰ One of these is the Democratic Republic of Congo which as of late April 2026 has reportedly accepted the first flights of migrants. This program could rapidly scale up with groups including up to 1,000 Afghans allied with the U.S. government potentially being sent to Congo.¹¹ These deals are again symbolic of the transactional foreign policy the U.S. under Trump seeks to pursue with considerations for human rights or international law being minimal to none for the migrants being shipped to Congo.

While the U.S. government has made large scale agreements with the Congo this should also not overshadow the smaller deals made by American businesses and private military groups. One of the largest recent developments American owned KoBold Metals acquiring the Manono Lithium mine.¹² The mine is now set to receive a 1-billion-dollar investment to bring it up to “western standards”. Former Blackwater founder Erik Prince has also used his new company, Frontier Services Group, to sign a private agreement providing security for mines.¹³

These large-scale deals threaten the artisanal small scale mining industries also. Large amounts of capital are able to more successfully develop mines into profitable ventures that generate increasing profit for those involved. The weakening of the artisanal mining sector may help to alleviate many of the labor exploitations present in these small scale mines but it also takes away a means of financial subsistence for the workers and leaves them without security.

In conclusion, the return of Donald Trump to the White House has given opportunities to the Congolese government and various elites in the country but has come at the expense of human rights and Congolese economic sovereignty. Deals made in the first year or Trump’s new administration have handed over vast riches of the Congolese mining business while doing little to actually bring peace to the Conflict with M23 or ensure the wealth ends up back in the hands of the average Congolese citizen. In addition to these new deals covering migration and coming from oligarchs in the American private sector showcase the increasing willingness of the Tshisekedi to act in compliance with western interests and for the enrichment of large business.

Written by Alec Hennessy

(Image taken from Bloomberg)

References:

Wazalendo Militias: History And Role In The Eastern Congo War

July 20, 2026

On Saturday March 14^th, 2026, at about 5:55pm GMT+2 various Wazalendo militias launched attacks on M23 rebel positions near the town of Malemo in the Masisi Territory of North Kivu. The objective was to take back territory that was held by the M23 rebel movement since 2022. The new offensive as reported by Actualite.CD followed up on previous attacks and involved significant damage and disruptions to civilian lives. These attacks are becoming increasingly common as government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its armed forces (FARDC) have sought to relinquish responsibility for combatting rebels in Eastern Congo increasingly to irregular formations like the Wazalendo militias.

The various Wazalendo militias that now combat the M23 rebels were created due to the inadequacy of the central FARDC army to counter the threat. Despite military assistance being pledged from international donors like China, and the support of the UN MONUSCO mission, institutional problems such as corruption, lack of available soldiers, and control issues meant that the government was unable to contain rebel attacks in the Kivu. In response Congolese president Felix Tshisekedi, called on Congolese people to form loyal militias in order to protect the country. This call was heeded by many former anti-government rebels including previous Mayi Mayi insurgents who were eager for legitimacy, and the support of the FARDC, as well as various local self-defense militias. The name Wazalendo or patriot in Swahili was chosen to demonstrate the new allegiances of these soldiers. Since 2022 these groups have expanded though continue to lack an overarching strategy.

While the government may be appreciative of the loyal Wazalendo militias for combatting the rebel groups these militias often lack adequate training and are extremely difficult for central authority to control and coordinate. Most of the equipment used by Wazalendos is light weapons and comes from the FARDC, and recruitment is primarily conducted on a local basis though forced coercion of both adults and children is also present according to international reporting. The biggest constraint however is the lacking ability of the central government to control all local Wazalendo militia leaders. The various Wazalendo leaders do not speak for the whole network of armed groups, and even experience problems enforcing order and discipline within their own units. This limits their effectiveness on the battlefield but critically also makes them more prone to attacks on civilian groups they were meant to protect. A September 2025 UN report on violence in North and South Kivu highlighted increasing attacks on civilians committed by all sides of the conflict including the FARDC and the local Wazalendo militias. Wazalendo groups are alleged by the report to have committed violence on civilians including robbery, use of child soldiers, and widespread sexual violence against women and girls.

The Wazaleno militias also have documented desertion problems and frequently engage in friendly fire attacks with the FARDC forces. In December 2025 this was demonstrated during the Uvira offensive when retreating FARDC forces clashed with Wazalendo militias attempting to take their equipment and allowed the M23 rebels to gain control of the strategic town of Uvira. Perhaps the greatest threat present, however, is establishing the precedent in delegating national security to armed militia groups which could later find keeping their own power preferable to taking orders from the government. Current peace talks have so far not included the various Wazalendo militias in their mediation, which means they are unlikely to bring about a lasting solution if they cannot bring all armed groups to an agreement.

Written by Alec Hennessy

(Image taken from Africa Defense Forums)

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CME Ebola Treatment Center Receives Surgical Gowns from the Basandja Coalition

July 20, 2026

A batch of surgical gowns has been donated to the staff of the Ebola Treatment Center at the Evangelical Medical Center (CME) Hospital in Bunia, Ituri Province. The donation was made by the Basandja Coalition at a time when the region is affected by the Ebola virus.

By Akilimali Chomachoma

In a calm atmosphere, enclosed walkways marked with red mats attached to wooden poles lead to several bags filled with green surgical gowns. The RK Foundation is providing support to healthcare workers who are on the front line of treating Ebola patients.

“Knowing that you, the medical staff, are on the front line and are the first to be exposed, we decided to focus our efforts on supporting healthcare workers. That is why we are donating these surgical gowns today through the RK Foundation, with the support of the Basandja Coalition,” said Stella Ramazani, Coordinator of the Basandja Coalition.

Nicole Landu Mawadi is a physician at CME Hospital. Following the declaration of the Ebola outbreak, she became the supervisor of the Ebola Treatment Center. According to her, this donation will greatly assist her teams in carrying out their work.

“We sincerely thank the Basandja Association and the Foundation for providing us today with surgical gowns. This support strengthens and encourages our staff, who are constantly in contact with patients and require adequate protective equipment to care for those hospitalized. We receive new staff members every day, which increases our need for surgical gowns. We will always need equipment to help us fight this epidemic,” she said.

The Basandja Coalition is an alliance of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo dedicated to responsible environmental management, climate justice, and community-led humanitarian assistance. Officially established as a coalition in 2022, the organization operates in several regions, including the tropical forests of the Congo Basin, peatlands, and mining communities.

Since the Ebola outbreak was declared in the DRC, the coalition has been involved with a specific focus on strengthening community participation in the response to the epidemic. Stella Ramazani explained:

“We have Woman Power, which mainly works in communication and Community Engagement and Risk Communication (CERC). They conduct awareness campaigns and radio programs within communities. We also have FADEM, a women’s organization working here that carries out awareness-raising activities. In addition, SOFEPADI operates a health center here. They are also taking action within the community with funding from the Basandja Coalition.”

Dr. Job Kabagambe, Chief Medical Officer at CME Hospital, emphasized the continuing need for medical supplies:

“We continue to receive a large number of patients, and we are making every effort to increase our treatment capacity. This always requires the availability of medical supplies. Although we manage to obtain some equipment, the need remains constant.”

Continental Liberation Movement or Alliance of Convenience? DRC-AES Relations

July 20, 2026

Asserting national sovereignty has always been difficult in post-colonial Africa due to neocolonialism and the subsequent continued interest of multinational foreign companies and governments. Recently, however, three military led states appear to have largely bucked the western led international order have united to preserve their local control and formed their own alliance in the Sahel.¹ The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is composed of the member countries Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The countries work together to coordinate military resources and international development efforts in order to support their respective governments and allies in contrast to the previous governments which worked closely with France in military and economic matters.^2,3,4

The shift away from France is not complete in the Sahel as states like Senegal and Chad are still cooperating heavily with France, but one cannot deny the recent trend of the AES integration both externally through defense and internally through efforts like the common biometric card.^5,6,7 Members like Mali and Burkina Faso have especially started to ally with China and especially Russia not only to seek out other anti-western partners, but also out of military necessity.^8,9 Islamist insurgent activity all across the region has greatly threatened these nations’ stability.¹⁰ Previous European and American military forces withdrew throughout much of the early 2020s and have since been replaced largely by members of the Russian Africa Corps which has had a so far unfavorable track record both in battlefield results and in consideration for human rights.^11,12,13

This new alliance between the AES and anti-western partners like Russia has put a nation such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a difficult situation. Historically the DRC under leaders like Patrice Lumumba has been friendly to states like the AES that promote African self-reliance and autonomy, like the short-lived Union of African states.¹⁴ Documents allege that Lumumba had even signed a secret agreement that the DRC would join this alliance, however with the Congo crisis and coup this never came to pass, and the Union of African states soon dissolved.¹⁵ In the modern age there are new considerations to consider for the DRC when dealing with African Unity. On the one hand the DRC may be eager to promote African independence and especially given the post-colonial history of the Congo many Congolese citizens support the Sahel triumvirate in their efforts. Both the DRC and the AES states also feel alienation from regional security alliances such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AES nearly going to war and the Congo accusing the Eastern African Community of intervening in its conflict on the side of M23.^16,17 On the other hand, the actions taking place in the Sahel come during increased business between the DRC and a vast array of western government and commercial negotiations and contracts. The government of Felix Tshisekedi has been previously critical of the western withdrawal from the Sahel, but as of yet has not officially stated any intention to enter into formal alliance with the AES despite overtures of cooperation.^18,19

This is most likely due to the consequences that would be faced in the business world and politically within the DRC. Economically speaking due to the significant U.S. and European investment that is taking place in the DRC to build up it’s mining and mineral exports this could be undermined if investors felt that such projects were likely to be nationalized or if western businesses were ejected from the country.^20,21 The economic fallout is perhaps the biggest reason why the Tshisekedi government has not been particularly vocal in its support of the AES, but the political considerations should also not be forgotten. While supporting other African states in the face of western colonialism is likely to bring an increase in the broader public support it could also create potential alliances for the factions that the DRC opposes in conflict like the M23 movement. M23 and its Rwandan backers would certainly cherish the opportunity to drive a large wedge between the DRC and western nations or even pull some of those countries to its side by promising spoils from the mineral revenue if their side controls the resource extraction.²²

The government inaction however should not diminish the significant goodwill that is felt by the Congolese population towards the states of the Sahel and against the west.²³ Being firmly anti colonial provides significant domestic support across much of Africa even despite large scale democratic backsliding in the aftermath of the Coup government’s rise to power. The military governments like that of Ibrahim Traore in Burkina Faso have largely eroded any previous democratic norms and set themselves up to remain in power despite domestic opposition and threats from internal Islamist rebels.^24,25 The military government in Mali under the control of General Assimi Goita has been battling a costly rebel offensive since late April 2026 that largely pushed out Russian allies from the countries northern regions and subjected the Capital of Bamako to periodic blockades and fuel shortages.^26,27,28,29 This democratic pullback and military vulnerability make the AES fragile allies which can little afford to send resources to grow their continental network and support a country like the DRC. Such support would also likely bring them into conflict with the large and relatively well-equipped regional power of Rwanda and potentially other states.

It is for these reasons that the current AES and DRC relationship is unlikely to grow and mature into a formal future alliance. Both sides would have too much to lose from supporting the other with the DRC risking losing its western and gulf states investment and worsening its domestic conflict while the states of the Sahel remain focused on existential survival and keeping their current allies like Russia invested in the region.³⁰ The current status quo of informal support from the Congolese public can possibly shape government policy to be more openly accepting of the AES however this would need to be proven in upcoming Congolese elections or by Citizens making their voices heard to support the alliance.

Written by Alec Hennessy

(Image taken from Aljazeera)

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2028 Congolese Elections: Influences, Challenges, and Opportunities

July 20, 2026

Following the 2023 Congolese General Election and the widespread violence and accusations of election fraud, Felix Tshisekedi began a second term as president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).^1,2,3 His coalition party, the Sacred Union of the Nation (Union Sacrée de la Nation) secured sweeping supermajorities in the senate and national assembly and he personally claimed to win the presidential election with over 75 percent of the vote.⁴ One of the opposition parties, Ensemble reported having their protests outlawed and suffered police and electoral crackdowns.⁵ In the actual election their presidential candidate Moise Katumbi only received around 18 percent of the vote centered largely around the Katanga region as he was previously the governor there.⁶

While Tshisekedi was able to retain control through the election, the pattern of ballot fraud, intimidation and voter suppression has continued to set the stage for the next upcoming Congolese elections especially the 2028 general election. Perhaps the largest electoral issue is the constitutional changes proposed by Felix Tshisekedi that would allow him to ignore the constitutionally mandated term limits and run for a third term as president.⁷ This first was brought up by Tshisekedi in May 2026 who said, “I have not asked for a third term, but if the people want it, I will accept”.⁸ This language combined with legislation from his allies in the national assembly to change the constitution means that the threat is real of a repeat of Joseph Kabila’s 2016 attempt to remain in power past his 2016 end of term.⁹ The justification for overturning the constitution that was provided was that the current conflict between the DRC and the M23 rebel movement in the Eastern Congo around Kivu.¹⁰ [GU1] This is despite the fact that the 2023 general election was also held during a period of escalated conflict with the rebel group.

The attempt to change the constitution has given new hope to the country’s opposition coalitions that they may be able to defeat the incumbent Tshisekedi.¹¹ The constitutional challenge and opposition resistance ultimately proved enough to topple Joseph Kabila if historical precedent is an indication of the power of opposition. That being said there should be some words of caution to the would-be opposition to Felix Tshisekedi.¹² The first is that they have increasingly been targeted by the state apparatus in political crackdowns.¹³ Not only has the parties of former president Joseph Kabia been banned on national security charges but new opposition groups like that of Moise Katumbi and Martin Fayulu are also under state surveillance with their events being suspended and targeted by violence. Opposition groups also face a challenge if they are able to win control of the government. Being able to successfully govern in Congo would prove difficult even without the likely resistance from Tshisekedi loyalists still in positions of power.

Another consideration is the role of the various churches in the electoral process in Congo.¹⁴ The Catholic church as the representative of the majority of the population carries significant weight in Congolese politics. In 2018 the Catholic leadership was the loudest voice calling for the 2018 elections to not be delayed.¹⁵ The church is a certified election observer and often inserts itself where it believes that democratic process is in danger to help facilitate protests or other methods of resistance.¹⁶ When dealing with the Tshisekedi government the church has often criticized executive power grabs such as the current effort to remove term limits.^17,18 It is possible that in the future the Catholic church could come out as a vital endorsement or source of support for the opposition like it was in pervious times under more autocratic Congolese governments. While being a predominantly catholic country there are also various mainline and evangelical protestant groups that have large sway in communities.¹⁹ Some of the mainline protestant groups are in line with the Catholic church in social organization and protecting democracy however similar to the experience in Latin America there is also significant friction between long established Catholic views on social issues and new Evangelical protestant churches.²⁰ Recently the Congo has seen a surge in “born again” or revivalist evangelical protestant churches that are largely non-denominational and allied to the conservative state administration. President Tshisekedi has even openly courted the support of this more conservative interpretation of Christianity to balance out his declining support among Catholics.²¹ While evangelical Christianity has been in the Congo since Swedish missionaries in the 1800s the recent rise of evangelical conservative churches has been in part funded and supported by the same American religious organizations that sought to promote evangelical Protestantism in opposition to Catholic liberation theology in places such as Latin America. This increasing religious polarization in the Congo between a democratic minded Catholic and mainline protestants and a conservative state supporting evangelical base is likely to further divide Congolese society and could be a significant source of friction in the 2028 election.

While religion is likely to be a source of division for the country in the upcoming election, a potential unifier is the countries' participation in the world cup this year. Congolese victory over Jamacia in the world cup qualifiers was momentous occasion in the country as it heralded the return of the Congo to the world cup after 52 years of tournament absence.²² On their return the players were gifted land, vehicles and other prizes to celebrate their occasion, however, some see potential for more than just a sports victory to come out of the occasion.²³ President Tshisekedi has been speculated to be using the opportunity as a rallying cry for the current Congo administration perhaps by visiting the team during their first game in Houston. The reason for visiting the team would most likely be to associate himself and his party with the current source of national pride for average Congolese citizens ahead of elections.

In conclusion the Congolese general elections of 2028 are set to mark a turning point in the countries’ history no matter the result. Following the likely fraudulent 2023 election it marks a vital test for the democracy of the country and especially if presidential term limits are amended could mark the potential end of the current fragile experiment with democracy in the DRC. Various factors such as the opposition unity, religious divide, and world cup unity are set to take the stage and all play vital roles in deciding the future of Africa’s heart.

Written by Alec Hennessy

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[GU1]Can you develop more this argument?

Start of Clinical Trials for Ebola Treatments: Two Drug Candidates Selected

July 20, 2026

A clinical trial evaluating two treatments against the Bundibugyo strain, a rare variant of the Ebola virus, officially began on Thursday, July 2, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The launch ceremony took place at the Evangelical Medical Center (EMC). These first treatment candidates come as the virus continues to spread rapidly across this part of the country.

By Akilimali Chomachoma, in Bunia

This scientific study aims to assess the effectiveness of two potential drug candidates against the country's 17th Ebola outbreak, which has already claimed the lives of several hundred people nationwide.

"As you know, during this outbreak we also had to conduct research to identify specific drug molecules capable of treating this Ebola virus disease," said Dr. Dieudonné Mwamba Kazadi, Director General of the National Institute of Public Health (INSP). He added, "This clinical trial will help determine which drug or molecule is the most effective and can be used to treat Ebola patients."

Although many questions remain about these clinical trials, healthcare workers see them as a source of hope. Baraka Bulambula, a nurse who has worked for several years at the Evangelical Medical Center (EMC) in Bunia, contracted Ebola while carrying out his professional duties in the middle of may. After spending several weeks at an Ebola Treatment Center, he became one of the first patients officially declared cured of the disease on June 1, 2026.

For him, these clinical trials are "good news. They will certainly help stabilize the situation, and we need many more survivors like me." The trial will evaluate a monoclonal antibody against the virus, MBP134, as well as the antiviral drug remdesivir. "We will also continue providing supportive care. Therefore, the study will include four treatment arms," explained Dr. Dieudonné Mwamba Kazadi.

MBP134 is an experimental cocktail of monoclonal antibodies currently being evaluated in clinical trials involving patients infected with the Bundibugyo strain of Ebola virus disease. It was developed by Mapp Biopharmaceutical.

Remdesivir is a broad-spectrum nucleotide analogue antiviral prodrug administered intravenously. Originally discovered and developed by Gilead Sciences, it was created in the early 2010s in response to emerging viral threats, building on more than a decade of research.

These drug candidates will be administered either individually or in combination to evaluate their effectiveness and safety against this specific Ebola variant, for which no approved treatment has previously been available in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

However, according to researchers from the National Institute for Biomedical Research (INRB), it may take at least several months before an approved treatment becomes available. "We expect these clinical trials to last between three and six months. This will depend on how the outbreak evolves and on the number of patients enrolled during the trial," explained Professor Placide Mbala Kingebeni, Director of the Bundibugyo Ebola Laboratories.

From an organizational standpoint, the clinical trial is coordinated by the National Institute for Biomedical Research (INRB). The Congolese institution is supported technically and logistically by a coalition of international partners, led by the World Health Organization (WHO), while working closely with the affected local communities.

"The launch of this clinical trial evaluating two drug candidates for the treatment of Bundibugyo strain Ebola virus disease brings us great relief and genuine hope. We are delighted by this scientific progress and eagerly await the results to determine whether these molecules can improve patient care," said Dr. Patient Mazirani, Medical Director of the Universal Clinic.

"Patients participating in the trial will receive comprehensive supportive care and close monitoring. We are also committed to ensuring they have access to these two medicines if they prove to be safe and effective during the study," added Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the WHO.

To obtain reliable results, specialists estimate that at least 500 participants will be required. "This will allow us to thoroughly analyze which treatment performs best. It will better equip us to treat Ebola patients more effectively and to prepare for future outbreaks," concluded Professor Placide Mbala Kingebeni.

Caption: One of the pharmacists at the Ebola Treatment Center "CME" in Bunia responding to a medical prescription. Photo by Akilimali Chomachoma

Year: 2026