Asserting national sovereignty has always been difficult in post-colonial Africa due to neocolonialism and the subsequent continued interest of multinational foreign companies and governments. Recently, however, three military led states appear to have largely bucked the western led international order have united to preserve their local control and formed their own alliance in the Sahel.1 The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is composed of the member countries Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The countries work together to coordinate military resources and international development efforts in order to support their respective governments and allies in contrast to the previous governments which worked closely with France in military and economic matters.2,3,4
The shift away from France is not complete in the Sahel as states like Senegal and Chad are still cooperating heavily with France, but one cannot deny the recent trend of the AES integration both externally through defense and internally through efforts like the common biometric card.5,6,7 Members like Mali and Burkina Faso have especially started to ally with China and especially Russia not only to seek out other anti-western partners, but also out of military necessity.8,9 Islamist insurgent activity all across the region has greatly threatened these nations’ stability.10 Previous European and American military forces withdrew throughout much of the early 2020s and have since been replaced largely by members of the Russian Africa Corps which has had a so far unfavorable track record both in battlefield results and in consideration for human rights.11,12,13
This new alliance between the AES and anti-western partners like Russia has put a nation such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in a difficult situation. Historically the DRC under leaders like Patrice Lumumba has been friendly to states like the AES that promote African self-reliance and autonomy, like the short-lived Union of African states.14 Documents allege that Lumumba had even signed a secret agreement that the DRC would join this alliance, however with the Congo crisis and coup this never came to pass, and the Union of African states soon dissolved.15 In the modern age there are new considerations to consider for the DRC when dealing with African Unity. On the one hand the DRC may be eager to promote African independence and especially given the post-colonial history of the Congo many Congolese citizens support the Sahel triumvirate in their efforts. Both the DRC and the AES states also feel alienation from regional security alliances such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AES nearly going to war and the Congo accusing the Eastern African Community of intervening in its conflict on the side of M23.16,17 On the other hand, the actions taking place in the Sahel come during increased business between the DRC and a vast array of western government and commercial negotiations and contracts. The government of Felix Tshisekedi has been previously critical of the western withdrawal from the Sahel, but as of yet has not officially stated any intention to enter into formal alliance with the AES despite overtures of cooperation.18,19
This is most likely due to the consequences that would be faced in the business world and politically within the DRC. Economically speaking due to the significant U.S. and European investment that is taking place in the DRC to build up it’s mining and mineral exports this could be undermined if investors felt that such projects were likely to be nationalized or if western businesses were ejected from the country.20,21 The economic fallout is perhaps the biggest reason why the Tshisekedi government has not been particularly vocal in its support of the AES, but the political considerations should also not be forgotten. While supporting other African states in the face of western colonialism is likely to bring an increase in the broader public support it could also create potential alliances for the factions that the DRC opposes in conflict like the M23 movement. M23 and its Rwandan backers would certainly cherish the opportunity to drive a large wedge between the DRC and western nations or even pull some of those countries to its side by promising spoils from the mineral revenue if their side controls the resource extraction.22
The government inaction however should not diminish the significant goodwill that is felt by the Congolese population towards the states of the Sahel and against the west.23 Being firmly anti colonial provides significant domestic support across much of Africa even despite large scale democratic backsliding in the aftermath of the Coup government’s rise to power. The military governments like that of Ibrahim Traore in Burkina Faso have largely eroded any previous democratic norms and set themselves up to remain in power despite domestic opposition and threats from internal Islamist rebels.24,25 The military government in Mali under the control of General Assimi Goita has been battling a costly rebel offensive since late April 2026 that largely pushed out Russian allies from the countries northern regions and subjected the Capital of Bamako to periodic blockades and fuel shortages.26,27,28,29 This democratic pullback and military vulnerability make the AES fragile allies which can little afford to send resources to grow their continental network and support a country like the DRC. Such support would also likely bring them into conflict with the large and relatively well-equipped regional power of Rwanda and potentially other states.
It is for these reasons that the current AES and DRC relationship is unlikely to grow and mature into a formal future alliance. Both sides would have too much to lose from supporting the other with the DRC risking losing its western and gulf states investment and worsening its domestic conflict while the states of the Sahel remain focused on existential survival and keeping their current allies like Russia invested in the region.30 The current status quo of informal support from the Congolese public can possibly shape government policy to be more openly accepting of the AES however this would need to be proven in upcoming Congolese elections or by Citizens making their voices heard to support the alliance.
Written by Alec Hennessy
(Image taken from Aljazeera)
References:
- https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-the-aes-unified-force-succeed-where-the-g5-sahel-failed
- https://www.military.africa/2025/12/aes-launches-unified-force/
- https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/sahel-alliance/
- https://democracyinafrica.org/changing-alliances-a-critical-analysis-of-frances-exit-from-francophone-africa/
- https://democracyinafrica.org/changing-alliances-a-critical-analysis-of-frances-exit-from-francophone-africa/
- https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260130-france-and-chad-seek-to-reset-ties-one-year-on-from-military-split
- https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/niger-joins-burkina-faso-as-second-aes-state-to-launch-biometric-id/gycygfp
- https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/chinas-sahel-gamble-falters-as-insurgencies-rage/
- https://gjia.georgetown.edu/global-governance/russia-in-africa-private-military-proxies-in-the-sahel/
- https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2026a-mig-widening-militant-islamist-threat/
- https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/russia-africa-corps-business-of-conflict/
- https://adf-magazine.com/2026/05/mali-siege-reveals-weakness-of-mercenary-model/
- https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crmx7x3yjyko
- https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2018/5/2/april-29-1958-ghana-guinea-union-formed
- https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v21/d245
- https://gssr.georgetown.edu/the-forum/regions/africa/coalition-of-coups-the-aes-ecowas-split-and-west-africas-security-crisis/
- https://www.voanews.com/a/drc-president-accuses-east-african-forces-of-co-habitiating-with-m23-rebels-/7087283.html
- https://gadebate.un.org/en/78/democratic-republic-congo
- https://fr.apanews.net/diplomacy/le-president-malien-recoit-le-ministre-de-la-justice-congolais/
- https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/joint-statement-declaration-of-intent-from-the-united-states-government-and-the-european-commission-on-the-lobito-corridor-and-investment-in-the-great-lakes-region
- https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-launches-100-million-us-backed-mining-guard-secure-sites-2026-04-27/
- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgyzl1mlkvo
- https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-congos-fork-in-the-road-if-the-west-wont-intervene-russia-will/
- https://freedomhouse.org/country/burkina-faso
- https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cly0zp1xgz3o
- https://www.theafricareport.com/416447/assimi-goita-silent-rebels-seize-northern-stronghold-what-we-know-about-the-mali-attacks/
- https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/10/africa/putin-africa-corps-kidal-mali-intl-cmd
- https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2026/05/13/mali-s-junta-effectively-under-siege-since-bamako-attack_6753417_124.html
- https://adf-magazine.com/2026/01/in-mali-general-appointed-to-win-bamakos-fuel-war/
- https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-middle-east/2025/07/the-geopolitics-of-the-gulf-states-push-for-critical-minerals/
