Wazalendo Militias: History And Role In The Eastern Congo War

On Saturday March 14^th, 2026, at about 5:55pm GMT+2 various Wazalendo militias launched attacks on M23 rebel positions near the town of Malemo in the Masisi Territory of North Kivu. The objective was to take back territory that was held by the M23 rebel movement since 2022. The new offensive as reported by Actualite.CD followed up on previous attacks and involved significant damage and disruptions to civilian lives. These attacks are becoming increasingly common as government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its armed forces (FARDC) have sought to relinquish responsibility for combatting rebels in Eastern Congo increasingly to irregular formations like the Wazalendo militias.

The various Wazalendo militias that now combat the M23 rebels were created due to the inadequacy of the central FARDC army to counter the threat. Despite military assistance being pledged from international donors like China, and the support of the UN MONUSCO mission, institutional problems such as corruption, lack of available soldiers, and control issues meant that the government was unable to contain rebel attacks in the Kivu. In response Congolese president Felix Tshisekedi, called on Congolese people to form loyal militias in order to protect the country. This call was heeded by many former anti-government rebels including previous Mayi Mayi insurgents who were eager for legitimacy, and the support of the FARDC, as well as various local self-defense militias. The name Wazalendo or patriot in Swahili was chosen to demonstrate the new allegiances of these soldiers. Since 2022 these groups have expanded though continue to lack an overarching strategy.

While the government may be appreciative of the loyal Wazalendo militias for combatting the rebel groups these militias often lack adequate training and are extremely difficult for central authority to control and coordinate. Most of the equipment used by Wazalendos is light weapons and comes from the FARDC, and recruitment is primarily conducted on a local basis though forced coercion of both adults and children is also present according to international reporting. The biggest constraint however is the lacking ability of the central government to control all local Wazalendo militia leaders. The various Wazalendo leaders do not speak for the whole network of armed groups, and even experience problems enforcing order and discipline within their own units. This limits their effectiveness on the battlefield but critically also makes them more prone to attacks on civilian groups they were meant to protect. A September 2025 UN report on violence in North and South Kivu highlighted increasing attacks on civilians committed by all sides of the conflict including the FARDC and the local Wazalendo militias. Wazalendo groups are alleged by the report to have committed violence on civilians including robbery, use of child soldiers, and widespread sexual violence against women and girls.

The Wazaleno militias also have documented desertion problems and frequently engage in friendly fire attacks with the FARDC forces. In December 2025 this was demonstrated during the Uvira offensive when retreating FARDC forces clashed with Wazalendo militias attempting to take their equipment and allowed the M23 rebels to gain control of the strategic town of Uvira. Perhaps the greatest threat present, however, is establishing the precedent in delegating national security to armed militia groups which could later find keeping their own power preferable to taking orders from the government. Current peace talks have so far not included the various Wazalendo militias in their mediation, which means they are unlikely to bring about a lasting solution if they cannot bring all armed groups to an agreement.

Written by Alec Hennessy

(Image taken from Africa Defense Forums)

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